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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

city

did

not

dispute

that majority

consider the HGN test to be scientific evidence.

of

jurisdictions

The city admitted

that the HGN test is based on scientific principles.

The city

admitted that Officer Warner did not give any testimony as to the
scientific principles underlying the HGN test.

Warner admitted

lacking any knowledge regarding the principles underlying the HGN
test and even could not say whether the Salt Lake Police Department
used the HGN test regularly.

Warner used no equipment to ensure

accurate measurements. The observations he says he made that night
on

a

busy

street

without

equipment

cannot

be

verified

or

duplicated.
The trial court found, based upon the officer's testimony,
that the officer was unable to lay a foundation as to either
general acceptance or inherent reliability.

The court also found

there was no basis for taking judicial notice of the reliability of
the

test.

The

court

instructed

the

jury

that

no

evidence

establishing the reliability of the test had been admitted.

The

admission of the HGN testimony under these circumstances was error
creating a reasonable probability of prejudice.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CITY'S BRIEF SUPPORTS FINDING THAT THE
HGN TEST RESULT IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

A.

The City failed to support its contention
that HGN is not scientific evidence

The city did not dispute Ms. Garcia's assertion that the
majority of the jurisdictions considering the admissibility of
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results have found the test to
be scientific evidence.

In fact, in its Brief, the city related

cases from several jurisdictions that support finding HGN to be
scientific evidence.1
The city nevertheless asserted that "HGN is not a scientific
test within the meaning of Utah law."

City's Brief (CB) , pl3 . The

minimal authority cited by the city on this point does not support
its contention.
N.E.2d 1330

For example, the city cited State v. Bresson, 554

(Ohio 1990) .

The city noted that the Bresson court

allowed HGN testimony based only on the testimony of the officer

1

See City's Brief (CB), pp 16-17, citing State v. Witte, 836
P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992) (HGN "exceeds common knowledge") ; State
v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986) (HGN outside common
knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (HGN is scientific evidence because it is based on the
scientific principle that HGN is caused by alcohol consumption);
State v. Reed, 732 P.2d 66, 68 (Ore. App. 1986) (stating that,
unlike other field sobriety tests which elicit "reactions to
alcohol that are so common that we take judicial notice of them,"
HGN draws its convincing force from scientific principles.).
2

administering the test.

CB, pl7.

The city, however, did not disclose the limitations the court
placed on that testimony.

The Bresson court declined to allow the

officer to testify about any blood alcohol content indicated by the
HGN test because of due process difficulties, including: (1) the
officer's reading of the HGN test cannot be verified or duplicated
by an independent party, (2) the test's recognized margin of error
creates a problem in criminal cases which require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, (3) the circumstances under which the test is
administered at roadside may affect the reliability of the result,
and

(4)

nystagmus

consumption.

is

caused

conditions

other

than

alcohol

Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1336.2

The City also cited State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1988) in support of its assertion that HGN is not a
scientific test.

CB, pl5.

The city noted that the Gilbert court

stated that field tests are not "scientific tests."

See id.

The

city neglected to reveal, however, that the Gilbert case never
considers

the question of whether the HGN test

is

scientific

evidence, nor does the court at any time even mention the HGN test.
The city also cites State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154
1990).

CB, pl8.

(Iowa

It should be noted that Iowa has adopted a

2

Moreover, to the extent applicable at all, Appellant asserts
that the Bresson court's analysis is faulty. The court indicated
its belief that the HGN test does not require any special
foundation because, unlike the polygraph test, no special equipment
is required. First, Appellant would argue that, if HGN is used at
all, special equipment must be used to ensure accurate measurement.
Second, the Bresson court overlooks the fact that mere measurement
of observable phenomena is but one part of the necessary foundation
for scientific evidence. See Discussion at II.C. infra.
3

particularly "liberal approach to the admissibility of technical
information."

Murphy, 451 N.W.2d at 157.

The city overlooks the

fact that Utah's evidentiary requirements for scientific evidence
are most restrictive than those of the jurisdictions it cites.
Discussion at II.A.

B.

infra.

The
city's
own analytical
framework
supports finding that HGN is scientific
evidence

The city's own analytical
scientific
operates

See

evidence.
at

a

principles."

The

framework declares

city

physiological

conceded

level

is

that

that HGN is

"[t]he

based

on

way

HGN

scientific

CB, pll. The city also suggests that " [r] ef erence to

natural laws of science is an appropriate benchmark."

CB, pl5.

In

this regard, "the City acknowledge [d] that the source of HGN is
within the natural sciences."

CB, pl5.

Therefore, given that the

city does not dispute that the majority of jurisdictions have held
that

HGN

is

scientific

evidence,

and

because

the

city's

own

analytical framework suggests that the source of HGN is within the
natural sciences, this court should hold that HGN is scientific
evidence.

II.

THE CITY INCORRECTLY ATTEMPTS TO SET FORTH
RULE 702 AS THE APPROPRIATE FOUNDATIONAL
REQUIREMENT FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

A.

Rule 702
evidence

is

not

the

test

for

scientific

The City's brief is permeated with references to Rule 702.
See, eg., CB, pp 14, 16, 18, 20, 27, & 28.
4

The City's reliance on

rule 702 is misplaced.

The Utah Supreme Court has explained that

Rule 702 is not the correct standard for the admissibility of
scientific

evidence.

The

Court determined

that

the test

for

admissibility of scientific evidence is more restrictive than for
expert

evidence generally.

The Court has made

it clear that

"regardless of how rule 702 phrases the general

test

for the

admissibility of expert testimony, our case law superimposes a more
restrictive

test

whenever

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 397.

scientific

In

is

at

issue."

That test is the inherent reliability

requirement announced in Phillips.

B.

evidence

Id.

The city's analogies of HGN to other
evidence that might be admissible under
Rule 702 is are inapposite
response

to

Appellant's

claim

that

the

HGN

test

is

scientific evidence the City complains that "all knowledge that is
outside

common

scientific."

knowledge
CB, pl4.

and

experience

is

not

The City then presents,

necessarily
(without

any

authority, detail or analysis) , several inapposite examples of
testimony that might be admissible under Rule 702, but which would
be unlikely candidates for compliance with Rimmasch.
presents these examples:
building

techniques,

(1) a carpenter's testimony

CB, pl4;

(2) a truck

driver's

The city
regarding
testimony

regarding industry standards CB, pl4; (3) testimony that gunpowder
causes projectiles to be propelled, CB, pl8; and (4) the comparison
of shoeprints, CB, p29.
The city's "straw man" examples are easily distinguishable,
5

of course.

Who would argue that a carpenter could not testify

about building techniques?; what court would require a Rimmasch
foundation before allowing a truck driver to testify about how many
pounds he can haul?; is there anyone who would argue that gunpowder
does not propel bullets?; is it beyond the ability of lay jurors to
understand evidence that two shoeprints look the same?
The city's examples are plainly irrelevant.

Appellant never

sought to have the court require compliance with Rimmasch for all
testimony

that

is not common knowledge.

The

fact that

examples

from Rule 702 are so easily distinguishable

evidence

actually

supports

the notion

that

HGN

these

from HGN

requires

more

foundation.

C.

The city's attempt to distinguish Kofford
and Rimmasch is misguided

The city's attempt to distinguish Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d
11343

(Utah 1987) , is faulty.

The city argues that because HGN

does not require chemicals or a microscope like the human leucocyte
antigen (HLA) test, that it is not scientific evidence.
25.

The city's comparison is defective.

CB, pp 24-

The observation of a

phenomenon is only one part of the foundation required in both HLA
and HGN tests.

After the HLA chemical results are mechanically

observed, the proponent still must provide a foundation for 1) the
correctness of the genetic principles underlying the test, 2) the
accuracy and reliability of the methods used, 3) the effect of
variables

that

would

influence

the

accuracy

of

the

test,

4)

establishing that the actual method employed and the particular
6

test used in a given case were performed in accordance with proper
procedures and with proper materials and equipment; and 6) the
qualifications of the necessary witnesses.

Phillips v. Jackson,

615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980) . Like the HLA test, observation is
only one aspect of the foundation necessary to a valid HGN test.
At

trial,

Ms.

Garcia

suggested

the

following

foundational

requirements would be required in regards to HGN testimony:
(1) that nystagmus of the eye is an inherently
reliable indicator of an individual's blood alcohol
level or ability to safely operate a motor vehicle;
(2) that the 3-part HGN test performed by Warner is an
inherently reliable means of measuring nystagmus of the
eye,
(3) that Warner properly performed the tests on this
occasion,
(4) that Warner was sufficiently qualified to testify
as to the test's result.
Tr. 14, citing Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980)
and State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1117 (Kan. 1992).
Officer
necessary

Warner's

foundation

observations

for HGN test

are

only

results.

one

part

of

Warner provided no

testimony on the reliability of the principles or procedures.
CB, p 2 0 .

the

See

Moreover, the test he performed on this occasion was

fraught with fallibility.

See CB, pp25-28.

Thus, the city failed

to establish the requisite foundation for the HGN evidence.
The city also attempts to distinguish Rimmasch.

CB, p25; see

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) (testimony regarding
sexual abuse victim profile requires foundation as to reliability).

7

It

should

be

distinguishing

noted

that

Kofford

and

the

city's

Phillips

analytical

from

HGN

basis

testing

for

--

necessity of chemicals and microscopes -- breaks down here.

the

Surely

the city would not argue that the answers and actions of a child
victim cannot be observed without a microscope.
In

addition,

as

with

parentage

testing,

observation

of

phenomenon is but one part of the necessary foundation for the
testimony.

The Rimmasch court rejected evidence

from

experts

without a prior foundation of the reliability of the sexual abuse
victim profile theory.
similar

because,

phenomenon

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 403. HGN evidence is

in

addition

to

the

mere

observation

of

a

(nystagmus), a foundation as the reliability of the

underlying principle and the correct application of the principles
in a particular

case

is necessary

to ensure

that

there

is a

reliable basis for the testimony.

III.

OFFICER
WARNER'S
TESTIMONY
PROVIDED
INADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF
THE HGN TEST RESULTS

Officer Warner's testimony was insufficient foundation for the
HGN test because, among other things, he testified only to his
personal observations.

The city claimed that an "[e]xplanation of

scientific principles underlying physical processes is not required
for

testimony

based

on personal

observation."

CB, pl3.

As

explained in section II.C., supra,

personal observation is only one

step of the foundation required

for HGN as well as for other

evidence based on scientific principles.
8

In addition, Warner's testimony provided little basis for
establishing the reliability of HGN testing.

The city suggests

that Officer Warner could have qualified as an expert under Rule
702.
of

CB, p28. But Warner admitted to having no personal knowledge
the

biomechanical

processes

supposedly produces nystagmus.

by

which

Tr. 22.

alcohol

ingestion

He published no articles

nor any summaries of his findings for review; so his experiences
cannot be verified or duplicated.

Tr. 23.

He did not know what

the general opinion of the scientific community might be of the HGN
test.

Tr. 24.

He could not even say whether the Salt Lake Police

Department uses the test regularly.

Tr. 20.

The city admitted

that Warner did not testify as to the principles underlying the HGN
test.

CB, pl2.
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Casey concluded that there

was no basis for taking judicial notice of the reliability of the
test.

Tr. 35. Judge Casey took as stipulated the fact that Warner

was not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to
discuss them professionally.

Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11.

Finally, the

judge found that Warner was unable to provide a foundation of
either general acceptance or inherent reliability.

Tr. 35-36.

The city presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent
reliability of the HGN test.
trial

came

determined

from
that

arresting
police

The limited evidence presented at

officer

officers

do

Warner.
not

have

Most
the

courts

have

specialized

scientific training to testify about the HGN test's scientific

9

reliability.3

In this case, Warner provided no testimony regarding

the underlying principles of the test. This court should therefore
find the "foundation" laid at trial to have been inadequate.

IV.

THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS WITHOUT
THE REQUIRED FOUNDATION OF RELIABILITY
COMPOUNDS THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE
TESTIMONY

A.

The
city's
assertion
that
Warner's
testimony was "not admitted as expert
testimony"
aggravates,
rather
than
mitigates, the error

The city's argument that "The HGN evidence did not mislead the
jury because Officer Warner was not qualified before the jury as an
expert witness," is thoroughly specious.

See CB, pll.

view

evidence

turns

well-established

rules

of

The city's

upside

Contrary to city's view, lack of foundation does not excuse
admission of the HGN test results, it aggravates

down.
the

the error!

For example, according to the city's argument, if a court
allowed

testimony

requirements

regarding paternity without

announced

in Phillips, the court

the

foundational

could avoid all

prejudice simply by instructing the jury that "the witness was not
testifying as an expert!"

Or, a court could disregard Rimmasch and

allow witnesses to testify about their opinion of the truthfulness
of a sex crime victim without requiring any foundation of the
reliability of the sexual abuse victim profile.
Similarly, simply instructing the jury in the case at bar that
3

People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334 (Cal. 1994) (en banc)
(court agreed with "the weight of authority" that police officer
testimony is insufficient to establish general acceptance).
10

Officer Warner was not testifying as an "expert" does not repair
the damage.

The bell was rung -- the jury heard his testimony. As

the Rimmasch court noted, the rule requiring a foundation for
evidence based on scientific principles is to guard against the
danger of having the finder of fact simply "adopt the judgment of
the expert despite an inability to accurately appraise the validity
of the underlying science."

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 3 96.4

Because

Officer Warner could not provide the jury with information to
accurately appraise the validity of the science underlying the HGN
test, Warner's testimony created a misleading aura of certainty.

B.

The city's
assertion
that
Warner's
testimony about Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol
level did not prejudice her is simply
sophistry

Warner's testimony that Ms. Garcia exhibited the HGN cues that
indicated a blood alcohol level over .10 prejudiced Ms. Garcia.
The city argued that there was no prejudice because the city was
not trying to prove she had a BAC over
"incapable of safely driving."

.08, but that she was

CB, pl2.

The city's argument is fallacious.

Officer Warner did not

testify that HGN tends to show a defendant is incapable
driving

as the city pretends.

of

Rather, Officer Warner testified

that the HGN evidence indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood
content

over

the

legal

limit

safely

of

4

.08.

Specifically,

alcohol
Warner

See also State v. Merritt, 647 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Conn. App.
1994) (stating that the mechanics of the HGN test, unlike those of
other field sobriety tests, are not within the common knowledge of
lay jurors and have the potential to mislead jurors).
11

testified that " [I]t's been my training and it's been my experience
if nystagmus

is present prior to 45 degrees in both eyes the

person's BAC level, or blood alcohol content, is great, is at a .10
or greater."

Tr. 56.

He then went on to state that nystagmus was

present prior to 45 degrees in both of Ms. Garcia's eyes.

Tr. 57.

The city also attempted to downplay the effect of Warner's
testimony by changing his words.

The city characterized Warner's

testimony as being that "an individual could test above a certain
blood or breath alcohol percentage based on their performance on
the HGN test."

CB, p30 (emphasis added), citing Tr. 56.

testimony, however, was unqualified.

Warner's

He stated that when all six

HGN cues are present, the BAC "is at" .10 or greater.

Tr. 56.

In sum, the admission of HGN without any foundation regarding
the underlying principles increases the prejudicial effect on the
jury.

The

evidence

becomes

even

more

mysterious

foundational explanation were provided.

than

Thus, absent

if

a

adequate

foundation, the jury is even more likely to rely on the testimony
of the city's purported "expert".

C.

The

The city overstated the non-HGN evidence
in its brief in an attempt to mitigate
prejudice
city

exaggerated

presented at trial.

the

impact

of

the non-HGN

evidence

The city stated that the following evidence

supports the conviction: the driving pattern, defendant's physical
appearance,

speech,

lack

of

balance,

odor

of

alcohol,

performance, and refusal to take an Intoxilyzer test.
12

poor

See CB, p32.

The evidence referred to by the city is reviewed briefly below.
Regarding
testified

Ms. Garcia's

that he observed

"driving pattern,"

Officer

no moving violations.

Tr.

Warner
69-73.

Regarding her "physical appearance," Officer Warner stated that Ms.
Garcia appeared to be "pleasant and upbeat"; he noted that Ms.
Garcia had red eyes but admitted that there are many causes of red
eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke and pollution.

Tr. 75.

Regarding Ms. Garcia's "speech," Officer Warner testified that she
had normal (not slurred) speech.

Tr. 49.

Regarding Ms. Garcia's

"balance, " Officer Warner noted only one time during all the field
sobriety

testing

that

Ms. Garcia

lost

her

balance

only

once

momentarily when he asked her to assume an abnormal posture--the
"instructional stance."

Tr. 59.

Regarding an "odor of alcohol,"

Officer Warner testified that an odor of alcohol is not proof of
impairment and that even sober individuals who have just taken a
drink can have an odor of alcohol on their breath.

Tr. 73-74.

Regarding Ms. Garcia's supposedly "poor performance" on the
field sobriety tests, Officer Williams stated that he thought there
was one test she could not do but did not remember which one it
was.

Tr. 97.

Officer Warner admitted that Ms. Garcia's almost

perfect performance on the finger count test was not poor.

Tr. 83.

Ms. Garcia also performed well on the "Walk and Turn" test.
Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to
toe, with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking
and count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more
steps heel to toe back.

Tr. 60. Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle
13

injury but attempted to complete the test as asked.

Tr. 76.

Ms.

Garcia correctly walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did
not start too soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete
the nine steps without using her arms to balance, and touched heel
to toe on all but the 6th step.

Tr. 76-80.

Then she paused,

turned and asked Warner to clarify the directions for completing
the test.
poorly,

Tr. 80.

but

merely

multiphase test.

Warner failed Ms. Garcia, not for performing
for

asking

directions

for

completing

the

Tr. 80.

Regarding Ms. Garcia's "refusal," not only had she already
taken one
suspended.

breath test, she knew that her license was
Tr. 90.

already

Thus, evidence of her refusal to take the

second test in this case is not particularly probative.
Of course, the first test performed on Ms. Garcia was the HGN
test.

Warner testified that based on his experience the HGN test

indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol level of
higher.

.10 or

Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28. Thus, the HGN evidence could

have been sufficient in itself for the jury to find Ms. Garcia
guilty as charged.

CONCLUSION
The

admission

of

the

HGN

testimony

at

trial

without

a

foundation as to the reliability of the test was error creating a
reasonable probability of prejudice.

Therefore, Ms. Garcia asks

this court: (1) to find that the HGN test is scientific evidence
subject to a preliminary determination by the trial court as to
14

whether the evidence meets Utah's inherent reliability test, (2) to
find that the HGN testimony was erroneously admitted in this case,
and (3) to reverse and remand for a new trial,

DATED this ^ ^

day of November, 1995.

RALPH DELLAPIANA
Attorney for Appellant
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